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Abstract—Enterprises have recognised the importance of per-
sonal mobile devices for business and official use. Employees
and consumers have been freely accessing resources and services
from their principal organisation and partners’ businesses on
their mobile devices, to improve the efficiency and productivity
of their businesses. This mobile computing-based business model
has one major challenge, that of ascertaining and linking users’
identities and access rights across business partners. The parent
organisation owns all the confidential information about users
but the collaborative organisation has to verify users’ identities
and access rights to allow access to their services and resources.
This challenge involves resolving how to communicate users’
identities to collaborative organisations without sending their
confidential information. Several generic Identity and Access
Management (IAM) standards have been proposed, and three
have become established standards: Security Assertion Markup
Language (SAML), Open Authentication (OAuth), and OpenID
Connect (OIDC). Mobile computing and communication have
some specific requirements and limitations; therefore, this paper
evaluates these IAM standards to ascertain suitable IAM to
protect mobile computing and communication. This evaluation
is based on the three types of analyses: comparative analysis,
suitability analysis and security vulnerability analysis of SAML,
OAuth and OIDC.
Index Terms—Mobile Computing and Communication; Iden-
tity and Access Management; IAM; SAML; OAuth; OpenID
Connect; SSO
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile computing and communication enables enterprises
and consumers the flexibility to conduct their work at a
time and place which is convenient (anytime, anywhere),
increasing productivity and efficiency. However, this flexibility
of mobile devices in the enterprise presents additional security
challenges [1]. The biggest issue is to securely authenticate
and authorize staff and clients among all the collaborative
organisations. The parent organisation owns all the confidential
information about users but collaborative organisations have to
verify users’ identities and access rights to permit access to
their services and resources. This challenge involves resolving
how to transmit users’ identities to collaborative organisations
without sending their confidential information. The Identity
and Access Management (IAM) standard can be used as
an effective solution for authenticating and authorizing users
across all collaborative organisations [1].
IAM standards have been developed to support all au-
thentication and authorization activities at a corporate level.
IAM service providers offer a wide range of activities such
as user creation, user activation, user authentication, user
authorization, user activity monitoring, application usage, user
provisioning, user deprovisioning, user auditing, and user
revocation [2], [3]. There are various IAM standards avail-
able, of which, the established and effective IAM standards
are SAML, OAuth, and OIDC. These three IAM standards
cover the majority of the IAM marketplace. Currently, iden-
tity management services became a stand-alone IT function
known as IDaaS (Identity-as-a-Service). Mobile computing
and communications have several challenges such as mobility,
resource scarcity, heterogeneity, and insecure wireless mobile
communication [4], [5]. To consider these limitations, the IAM
standard for mobile computing requires some adaptations such
as lightweight protocols, energy efficiency, native mobile app
support and robust security [6], [7]. Therefore, this paper
evaluates these IAM standards to ascertain suitable IAM to
protect mobile computing and communications. Three types
of analyses are examined: comparative analysis, suitability
analysis and security vulnerability analysis of SAML, OAuth
and OIDC.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
elucidates SAML, OAuth and OIDC use cases for mobile
computing and communication; Section III expounds the com-
parative analysis of these IAM standards; Section IV critically
evaluates the suitability of these IAM standards for mobile
computing and communication; Section V performs security
vulnerability analysis of IAM standards; Section VI concludes
the paper and suggests some future work.
II. SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC USE CASES FOR MOBILE
COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATION
A. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
SAML is an XML-based framework developed by OASIS
for communicating user’s information related to authentication
and authorization [8]. It permits the two federated partners
Fig. 1. A SAML Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication
to select and share necessary identity attributes they require
in a SAML message/assertion provided that they can be
represented in XML [7]. A typical use case of SAML for
mobile computing and communication and its corresponding
steps are illustrated in Fig. 1 [2].
B. Open Authorization (OAuth)
OAuth is mainly an authorization protocol. OAuth facilitates
a user to permit access to an application to accomplish
approved functions on behalf of the user [9]. Accordingly,
it empowers an external application to gain restricted access
to an HTTP service. A typical OAuth use case for mobile
computing and communication and its corresponding steps are
illustrated in Fig. 2 [2].
C. OpenID Connect (OIDC)
OpenID Connect is a framework for transmitting identity
by using RESTful APIs [7]. OpenID Connect is not a new
Fig. 2. An OAuth Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication
Fig. 3. An OIDC Use Case for Mobile Computing and Communication
protocol rather it is a successor of OpenID 2.0 and developed
as a profile of OAuth 2.0 [7]. OpenID Connect uses two main
tokens: an Access Token and an ID Token. A typical use case
of OIDC for mobile computing and communication and its
corresponding steps are illustrated in Fig. 3 [2].
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IAM STANDARDS:
SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
Table I illustrates the comparative analysis of the three
predominant IAM standards SAML, OAuth and OIDC on the
basis of several explored criteria for this particular analysis
[1], [2].
IV. SUITABILITY ANALYSIS OF SAML, OAUTH AND
OIDC FOR MOBILE COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATION
The previous analysis has revealed the features, merits and
limitations of SAML, OAuth and ODIC standards. SAML and
OIDC both are a complete solution for the authentication and
authorization in for mobile computing and communication
system, though OAuth should be used for an authorization,
therefore, this analysis excludes it as an option.
An IAM standard should be a lightweight standard for
mobile computing and communication systems. They should
be able to apply data compression for reducing their size
and network traffic by removing unnecessary data [6], [10].
It should be compact and faster to manage as compared to
other communication protocols used in mobile communication
networks. SAML is an XML-oriented specification and the
representation of XML trees is quite verbose. Every element
of a tree is surrounded in a pair of tags with its name/ element
type. While OIDC is a JSON-oriented specification and the
representation of JSON trees is less verbose than XML as
it is in the form a nested array type analogous to that of
JavaScript. Consequently, the more compact size of OIDC
makes it the preferred choice for communication in HTML
and HTTP environments than SAML [11].
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT STANDARDS: SAML, OAUTH AND OIDC
Criteria SAML OAuth OIDC
1. Introduction Year 2005 2012 2014
2. Authentication and
Authorization
It is a standard for authentication
and authorization.
It is a standard for authorization
(delegation) of resources.
It is a standard for authentication
and authorization.
3. Main Purpose Identity and Access Management
(IAM), Single Sign-On (SSO) for
enterprise users.
API authorization between Appli-
cations.
Identity and Access Management
(IAM), Single Sign-On (SSO) for
consumers.
4. Token Format XML XML, JSON, JWT JSON, JWT
5. Token Content Token contains user identity infor-
mation but not credentials.
Token contains user identity infor-
mation but not credentials.
Token contains user identity infor-
mation but not credentials.
6. Security of Token
(Integrity/Non-repudiation)
XML Signature HMAC or X.509;
SAML tokens are almost always
signed with a private key, as it is
a trusted relationship between IdP
and SP.
Default bearer token has no proof
of possession. However, token con-
tents can be protected by using a
DS or a MAC.
JSON Web Signature (JWS)-
HMAC SHA-256 or X.509;
[Additional Support -RSA SHA-
256 and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256].
7. Security of Token
(Confidentiality/ Privacy)
XML Encryption- Triple-DES-
CBC with 192-bit key and a 64-bit
initialization Vector (IV), AES-
CBC with a 128-bit initialization
vector (IV); [TLS-SSL, Web
Services Security (WSS)].
TLS is mandatory to implement
with OAuth for token confiden-
tiality. However, token encryption
must be applied in addition to the
usage of TLS protection.
JSON Web Encryption (JWE)-
RSA-PKCS1-1.5 with 2048-bit
key, AES-128-CBC, and AES-
256-CBC; [Additional Support-
ECDH-ES with 256-bit key, AES-
128-GCM, and AES-256-GCM].
8. Lightweight Standard It is not a lightweight standard.
XML states trees in a verbose form.
Every element in the tree has a
name (the element type name), and
the element must be enclosed in a
matching pair of tags.
It is a lightweight standard. JSON
states trees in a nested array type
of notation similar to that of
Javascript. Indeed, a JSON doc-
ument can exactly be parsed as
Javascript to result in the corre-
sponding array.
It is a lightweight standard. Sim-
ilar to OAuth. JSON has a much
smaller grammar and maps.
9. Protocol Used XML, HTTP, SOAP JSON, HTTP, REST JSON, HTTP, REST
10. Schemas and
Deployments
SPML, SCIM SCIM SCIM
11. Platform Independent,
Vendor-Neutral and Open
Standard
It is a platform independent,
vendor-neutral and open standard.
However, flexibility in the
implementation leads to the
different design models.
It is a platform independent,
vendor-neutral and open standard.
However, flexibility in the
implementation leads to the
different design models.
It is a platform independent,
vendor-neutral and open standard.
It also standardised many
parameters such as instance
scopes, endpoint discovery, and
dynamic registration of clients,
which were left up to implementers
in the OAuth 2.0 implementation.
12. Web and Native Mobile
Apps Support
It is specially designed for Web
apps. However, HTTP artifact bind-
ing can be used to reduce the flow
of SAML messages through the
browser.
It supports both Web and native
mobile Apps.
It supports both Web and native
mobile Apps.
13. Mobile Standard It is limited in its ability to support
mobile and smart-TV devices.
It has been designed for the mobile
API and therefore it is also known
as a token in your mobile.
It has been working towards stan-
dardising a GSMA Mobile Connect
standard for mobile devices.
14. Enterprise and Con-
sumer Support
It mainly supports enterprise users
because it involves SP and IdP.
It supports enterprise users, and
consumer apps and services.
It supports enterprise users, and
consumer apps and services.
15. Fixed and Mobile
Telecom Examples
British Telecom, France Telecom,
Deutsche Telekom, NTT DoCoMo,
National IT and Telecom Agency
of Denmark.
Deutsche Telekom, Orange, T-
Mobile, Tata, AT&T, Vodafone,
Telecom Italia, TAT&T, France
Telecom, China Mobile, China
Telecom, Etisalat, KDDI, Telenor,
Telefonica, Telstra.
Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Voda-
fone, Telecom Italia, AT&T, France
Telecom, China Mobile, China
Telecom, Etisalat, KDDI, Tata,
Telefonica, Telenor, Telstra.
Mobile-based Single Sign-On (SSO) is one of the essential
requirements for mobile users. Mobile users access a large
number of apps and services and for them they require distinct
authentication and authorization [12]. This leads to several
issues such as remembering many passwords, regular login to
the same app or service, regular password change, phishing,
and password recovery. As a result, organizational productivity
is affected adversely. One of the common solutions is Single
Sign-On (SSO) which offers a centralized, and user-friendly
and secure method of authenticating [13]. SAML and OIDC
both are capable to offer the SSO functionality but OIDC is a
relatively more user-friendly SSO approach for small mobile
devices.
Mobile applications are a combination of applications writ-
ten in native, web and hybrid languages. JSON is derived from
JavaScript programming language, and its parsers are most
commonly available in other programming languages, because
they map directly to objects. XML was not designed for
programming and the sole purpose of XML was to transport
the data over on the Web. Therefore, it does not have a natural
document-to-object mapping. JWT is an industry standard and
is universally accepted on the Internet, offering the simplicity
of client side handling of the JWT on multiple platforms,
particularly, mobile [11]. Therefore, the use of JWT in the
development of mobile apps is common as it is relatively more
compatible than SAML assertions.
Mobile browsers are constrained in the maximum URL size
they can support. Additionally, WebView has many limita-
tions such as preventing the sharing of cookies, certificates,
and HTML local storage. OIDC uses JWT that does not
use sessions, therefore, it has no issues with native mobile
applications and WebView. Thus, OIDC specification is suited
for both Web browsers and WebViews (native mobile apps)
whilst SAML is only for Web browsers. However, HTTP
Artifact binding can be used to reduce the flow of SAML
messages through the browser. Alternatively, SAML can be
used for only authentication and, subsequently, OAuth can be
used for authorization, where the SAML assertion can be used
as the OAuth bearer token in the HTTP bearer header to access
protected resources.
Mobile communication is substantially based on the use of
mobile devices, where, the authentication and authorization
heavily rely on mobile objects, protocols and standards. SAML
offers an inadequate support for mobile devices because of
its old construction as it was developed in 2005, before the
introduction of first smart phone. While OIDC was introduced
recently in 2014 and offered features for mobile, IoT and web.
OIDC has also standardised a separate version mobile device
known as GSMA Mobile Connect standard.
The authentication and authorization requirements may vary
from one business model to another such as enterprise-to-
enterprise, enterprise-to-consumer, or within an enterprise.
A large segment of the mobile communication market is
associated with consumers only; therefore, any IAM standard
should provide support to consumers’ authentication and au-
thorization. The architectural design of SAML requires service
provider (SP) enterprise and identity provider (IdP) enterprise,
and a trustworthy relationship, therefore, it is mostly suit-
able for enterprise users (i.e., enterprise-to-enterprise). While,
OIDC design is also focused on end users and, therefore, it is
suitable for both enterprises and consumers and all business
models in case of untrusted third party association.
Security is always a great concern in mobile communica-
tions due to its insecure channels and it is more disposed to
eavesdropping attacks [14]. It requires two main protections;
confidential information should be protected from revelation to
unauthorized users, and the protection of security tokens which
should not be tampered with or altered during its entire life
cycle. For maintaining these two security provisions, strong
encryption techniques and digital signatures or MAC should
be incorporated in an IAM standard. SAML XML tokens
can be signed using XML Signature (XML-Sig) based on a
secret key (using the HMAC algorithm) or a public/private
key pair (in the form of a X.509 Certificate). In practice,
SAML tokens are generally signed with a private key because
of the established relationship between IdP and SP. SAML
XML token data can be encrypted using XML Encryption
(XML-Enc) based on a secret key (Triple-DES-192, AES-128)
or public/private key pair (RSA-PKCS1-1.5-192, RSA-OAEP-
128/256). However, signing a part of the message, creating
an overlapping signature and adding or subtracting text after
signature features make it vulnerable for a number of new
security threats. Furthermore, computing and verifying XML
signatures is very resource intensive [15]. OIDC JSON Web
Tokens can be signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) based
on a secret key (with HMAC algorithm) or a public/private
key pair (in the form of a X.509 Certificate). OIDC JWT
data can be encrypted using JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
based on a secret key (AES-128-CBC, and AES-256-CBC)
or public/private key pair (RSA-PKCS1-1.5-2048, ECDH-ES-
256). However, some JWT libraries treat tokens signed with
the none algorithm as a valid token with a verified signa-
ture, which allows arbitrary account access on some systems
[16]. SAML and OIDC both offer strong security features.
Nonetheless, complexity in signing XML with XML Digital
Signatures may leave some security holes as compared to the
simplicity of signing JSON [11]. Moreover, JWT does not
use sessions while SAML does; which prevents OIDC from
many attacks related to sessions including Cross-Site Request
Forgery (CSRF), thus, more secure for mobile computing and
communication.
Based on the previous two analyses, it is obvious that
SAML requires a revamp in order to make it suitable for
mobile computing and communication. OAuth is suitable for
an authorization only but not for an authentication. OAuth is a
supportive protocol for both SAML and OIDC. It is already an
essential component of OIDC specification while, it can also
be used with SAML to make it more suitable and lightweight
for mobile computing and communication. OpenID Connect
would be the most suitable choice for mobile computing and
communication because it satisfies most of the requirements
for them. Nonetheless, it is a developing standard and requires
wider acceptance for becoming an established IAM standard
for mobile computing and communication.
V. SECURITY VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF IDENTITY
AND ACCESS MANAGEMENT STANDARDS
This analysis illustrates that flawed deployment of the pow-
erful SAML and OIDC (OAuth is a part of OIDC) frameworks
may be easily exploited for attacks.
A. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
1) DoS Attack in SAML: SAML provides two common
message flows, an SP-initiated and IdP-initiated, and two
common SAML messages, an Authentication Request mes-
sage sent from an SP to an IdP, and a Response message,
containing a SAML assertion, sent from the IdP to the SP. An
Authentication Request message can be sent from an SP to
an IdP via the HTTP Redirect Binding, HTTP POST Binding,
or HTTP Artefact Binding; and the Response message can be
sent from an IdP to an SP via the HTTP POST Binding or the
HTTP Artefact Binding [17], [18], [19]. Furthermore, SAML
permits asymmetry in the message pair, allowing a different
binding on the return message to that of the initiating message.
The decision of which binding to use, is made according to
the configuration settings at the SP and the IdP sides [20].
A DoS attack in SAML is possible when the SP-Initiated
SSO (Redirect/POST Bindings) message flow is implemented.
The user tries to access a resource on the SP, but the identity
is managed by the IdP. Thus, the user is sent to the IdP to
log on and the IdP delivers a SAML web SSO assertion for
the user’s federated identity to the SP. This exchange uses
a Redirect Binding for the SP-to-IdP AuthnRequest message
and a POST Binding for the IdP-to-SP Response message.
Here, an attacker can target the IdP by sending abundance of
requests by compromising valid users or an honest SP because
the SAML request requires substantial processing overheads.
The effort required for processing of each Response assertion
is significantly greater than the effort required by an attacker
to generate the request [21]. This could easily overwhelm the
SAML IdP.
2) DoS Attack in OIDC: In OIDC discovery process, it
is necessary to obtain OIDC IdP’s configuration information.
The OIDC IdP allows metadata discovery and therefore, it
hosts its configuration information at the endpoint. In most
of the implementations, the endpoint is accessible by any
client/RP who is wishing to send registration request and thus,
it is publicly open and possibly non-secure. Subsequently,
OIDC client/RP sends an HTTP GET request to this metadata
endpoint to obtain the configuration information of the OIDC
IdP. The OIDC IdP sends a response which is a set of
Claims about the OIDC provider’s configuration, including all
necessary endpoints and public key location information that
can be used by client/RP for further communication with the
OIDC IdP or the OAuth authorization server.
A DoS attack in OIDC is possible when the endpoint is
publicly open and non-secure, and dynamic discovery process
is allowed without any authentication. This vulnerability can
be easily exploited for DoS attack on an OIDC IdP and flooded
by countless dynamic discovery requests, which could easily
overwhelm the OIDC IdP [22]. Additionally, this dynamic
discovery process may be exploited for DoS attack on the
client/RP, an attacker may try to spoof an OpenID IdP by pub-
lishing a discovery information that contains an issuer Claims
using the Issuer URL of the OIDC IdP being impersonated, but
with its own endpoints and signing keys. Thus, the client/RP
can be flooded with information by attacker.
B. Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack
1) MITM Attack in SAML: A MITM attack is possible in
SAML when the SP-Initiated SSO (POST/Artefact Bindings)
message flow is implemented. This exchange uses a POST
Binding for the SP-to-IdP AuthnRequest message and an
Artefact Binding for the IdP-to-SP Response message [20].
The user tries to access a resource on the SP but the identity
is managed by the IdP. The user enters correct credentials and
a local logon related security setting is generated for the user at
the IdP. Later, the IdP creates an artefact containing the source
ID for its website and a reference to the Response message
(the MessageHandle). The HTTP Artefact binding permits the
choice of either HTTP redirection or an HTML form POST
as a way to deliver the artefact to the SP [17].
The SP’s Assertion Consumer Service sends a SAML Arti-
factResolve message, which contains the artefact to the IdP’s
Artefact Resolution Service endpoint using the synchronous
SOAP binding. The IdP’s Artefact Resolution Service extracts
the MessageHandle from the artefact and finds the original
SAML Response message accompanying with it [17]. The
retrieved message is placed in a SAML ArtifactResponse
message that is returned to the SP using the synchronous
SOAP binding. The SP extracts and processes the Response
message and the embedded assertion for creating a local logon
security setting for the user at the SP [17].
In this SAML SP-Initiated SSO (POST/Artefact Bindings)
process, the SOAP binding is used which is vulnerable to the
MITM attack [23]. The RelayState token is not a transparent
reference to state information which is maintained at the SP.
This RelayState mechanism can leak information about the
user’s activities at the SP to the IdP if the SP deployment
is erroneous or some other kind of existing vulnerabilities
which may also lead to the MITM attack [24]. Since the HTTP
Artefact binding will be used to deliver the SAML Response
message, it is not compulsory that this assertion be digitally
signed which is also a great security risk and increases the
chances of the MITM attack in SAML.
2) MITM Attack in OIDC: A MITM attack is possible in
OIDC when the OIDC dynamic client registration process
is happened. For registering a new OIDC client/RP at the
Authorization Server, the client/RP sends an HTTP POST
message including its metadata to the Client Registration
Endpoint with a content type of application/JSON, and the
parameters represented as top-level elements of the root JSON
object. The subsequent response may carry a Registration
Access Token, which can be used by the client/RP to accom-
plish required tasks upon the resulting client/RP registration.
The OIDC IdP may require an Initial Access Token to limit
registration requests to only authorized clients or develop-
ers [22]. However, to support an open dynamic registration,
the Client Registration Endpoint should accept registration
requests without OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens. Therefore, the
dynamic client registration could be the potential source of
many attacks including the MITM attack.
This MITM attack may be caused by a logical flaw in
the OAuth 2.0 protocol or the presence of a malicious OIDC
IdP or malicious client/RP [25], [26]. A malicious OIDC IdP
can trick the client/RP into sending an authorization code
to the attacker’s Token Endpoint. Once a code is stolen, an
attacker can modify information of authorization requests and
responses for confusing the RP into binding an authorization to
the wrong user [27]. Consequently, the confused RP may select
wrong IdP at the start of the authentication or authorization
process [25], [26]. This permits a hacker to modify user data
and fool the RP into treating it as the IdP the user wants [25],
[26]. Accordingly, the RP sends the authorisation code or the
access token issued by the honest IdP to the attacker depending
on the OAuth mode employed. Finally, an attacker can utilise
this information for login into the client/RP under the user’s
identity (managed by the honest IdP) or accessing the user’s
protected resources at the honest IdP [25], [26].
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the evaluation of three popular IAM
standards, SAML, OAuth and OIDC to ascertain suitable
IAM to protect mobile computing and communication. This
evaluation is based on the three types of analyses: comparative
analysis, suitability analysis and security vulnerability analysis
of SAML, OAuth and OIDC. SAML was developed before
smart mobile phones were introduced, and therefore it has
many legacy features, which are not compatible with mobile
computing and communication and would require a revamp
to make it a more suitable IAM. OAuth is suitable for an
authorization only but not for an authentication. OpenID
Connect would be the best choice for mobile computing and
communication as it fulfils maximum requirements for them.
Nonetheless, it is a developing standard and requires wider
acceptance for becoming an established IAM standard for
mobile computing and communication. In the future, it may
be interesting to perform practical investigations on SAML,
OAuth and OIDC for mobile computing and communication
systems.
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